The Fundamental Right, Safety and Liberty OF THE PEOPLE,

47

(Which is radically in themselves, derivatively in the PARLIAMENT, their SUBSTITUTES, or REPRESENTATIVES) Briefly Asserted.

Wherein is discovered the great Good or Harm which may accrue unto the People by Parliaments, according to their different temperature and motions.

With some Proposals conducing towards an equal and just Settlement of the distracted State of this Nation.

And a touch at some especial Properties of a Supream good Governor or Governors.

The Safety of the People is the Supream, most Natural and most Righteous Law, being both the most proper End and most adequate Rule of Government.

London, Printed for *Giles Calvert*, and are to be sold at the Black-spread Eagle at the West end of *Pauls*. 1657.

To the present Parliament of England.

THE Righteous God loveth Righteousness, and he alone rightly weigheth, measureth and administreth in Judgment and Truth. Man hath a selfish Principle within, which secretly blindeth and draweth him aside in his purest aims and intentions. Man knoweth not his own heart, how much he is engaged for himself, what little truth of love, mercy and justice there is in him towards others. Every man thinks he minds the publique Good and Interest, little seeing or suspecting how straitly he is bound up within the narrow compass of himself. Every man pretendeth to be just, and very ready to amend the wilful or negligent miscarriages of others: but where are the men, who once attaining to greatness and power, slide not by degrees into the same paths of Injustice, which they condemned others for walking in? Man cannot observe his own errors, nor indeed can he bear to hear of them: He loveth himself so well, that he cannot discern that evil which is in himself, nor endure to be told of it by others; but thinks they deal injuriously

with him if they take notice of it, or warn him against it: for it is not evil in him, but an evil eye in them, which makes them look upon it as so.

The Powers of this World being so apt to err (and their errors being so like themselves, powerful) have great need of faithful Monitors and plain Dealers, but seldom meet with them, and their condition makes them little able to bear them. Their condition hath commonly this double bad influence upon them, it maketh them able to do ill, able to do harm; but unable to bear the sight or representation of them. It blindeth their own eyes, in reference to themselves and their actions; and maketh them enemies to him who is not equally blinded with them. Nor can it be otherwise, Man cannot take it well to have others telling him of that evil, which he upon search cannot find in himself; or to have them still blaming him for that as evil, which he himself accounteth as good.

O ye present great Ones (I speak it not in disrespect, but in honor, acknowledging that God, by his providence and dispose of things, hath made you great) Look upon that Snare, which hardly ever man, in your condition, avoyded!

Consider

Consider this poor Nation, its great Cost, its great Danger, your great Promises to it, and let its Right and Liberty be precious in your eyes. Consider (if it be possible) impartially its Right, and lead it into the possession of it. If ye walk in the way of man, ye will come to the end of man: If ye be Successors in unrighteousness, ye will end in ruine. Ye have an harder peece of Self-denyal to practise then yet ye have met with, if ye will be safe. (Your danger is greatest when ye seem most out of danger.) As there have been hitherto many Cries for you, so there are now many Cries to you, and Cries against you dayly. Complaints have seldom been greater, it behoves you to look thorowly that it be without a cause on your part. If the poor fatherless people be destitute of help, and have none to cry to but the righteous One (being wearied out with crying to man) it may make him the more regardful of their Cries, and the more speedy and strict in exacting an account of your Stewardship from you.

The FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, LIBERTY AND SAFETY of the People is here presented to your view in general with others (to whom also it appertaineth.) It concerneth

you most particularly to take notice of it, and to use industry and fidelity, answerable to your Power and Trust, to instate them in it; which how ever they may abuse, yet they ought to enjoy: And if ye cannot make them happy, yet putting things into their due order according to right, this will be a comfort unto you; that they are only made miserable by themselves: whereas if ye detain their Right from them, though with never so good an intent, that will not excuse you at present, nor afford you comfort at the last. Ye have expressed a great Sense of the Injuries which the People have suffered by being deprived of their Rights and Liberties, and have undertaken to restore them to the possession of them again; do it in truth. Let not Jealousies, of what may happen, cause you to turn aside from the direct path of Righteousness. Put them, as well as ye can, into a way of minding and prosecuting their own good; but take heed of overthrowing their Right and Liberty, though from never so great a desire to do them good. I am exceeding-jealous over you, lest ye should unwittingly be deceived by your own hearts, and unawares deceive the People: forgive me this Jealousie. It ariseth both from

love

love to you and the People: because my desire is so great, on the one hand, to have the People free and happy; and on the other hand, to have you the Instruments of it. For as my desire was towards those which went before you, while their day lasted, that they might rather have found the way of administring Righteousness to others, then of occasioning ruine to themselves: So is my desire now towards you, while your day remains; and O that ye could see, at least in this your day, the things that concern your peace, and the good of this Nation.

Every thing is bounded, but few things know their bounds; and so, passing beyond them, both give and receive wounds, which always smart and afflict, be they never so slight; but if they be very deep, tend to death. KINGLY POWER did pass its limits, we may now speak it. Doth PARLIAMENTARY POWER keep within its limits? How shall we resolve this fairly and clearly (resolve it indeed we may in our own Judgments and Consciences) when the limits of it are not determined? And if things should yet devolve lower, into the great and confused Body of the People, is it likely they would keep their limits?

O GOD, how is man entangled! So far from attaining true, inward, spiritual Liberty, that he cannot reach the shadow, the outward part, the earthly part, the liberty of man! So far are we from enjoying Liberty under any Government, that we can, at best, but groan and pant under it after Liberty. Man cannot be free in himself, nor free from himself (while Self is in him, it will make him selfish,) and while it is so, others under his power or within his reach cannot be free. O that the time of man were come to an end; that he who is righteous, and cannot but be righteous, would put unrighteous man out of place, and administer righteousness himself. Till then I expect no satisfaction, not only not in spiritual affairs, but not so much as in the Government of this World. Yet it behoveth you, who are in place and Power, to remove as far from your selves, and press on as near towards righteousness, as possibly ye may: for which end, to provoke you somewhat towards it, this ensuing Discourse is partly intended by him who exceedingly thirsteth to approve himself

An unfeigned Servant to the Lord of all,

to your selves, and to his Country,

Isaac Penington (junior.)

TO THE Sorrowful People OF This Sick Nation.

Poor People,

I Pity your condition, and in the midst of my own weights and pressures, have not learned wholly to forget yours. I cannot but bewail your miseries, which it is hard extricating out of. Ye have been long tossed in a sea of trouble, and are not yet come to the sight of Land. The necessities whereinto ye are cast, cannot but make your burthens heavy: yet this might somewhat ease them, if ye could but once discern the approach of a long expected end. Ye are far from attaining your Desires, and yet that may not be very ill for you, because ye your selves are so apt to mistake in your Desires, not truly understanding what may tend to make you happy. There is no safe retreating, how ever ye may think, and very hard to espy how to go forward comfortably. Ye may easily run into confusion and prove workers of your own ruine, but ye know not how to step one step aright towards Rest, Peace, Liberty.

To the People.

If I should tell you, that it were better to lie stil and suffer then seek after a disorderly remedy (for that is likely still to be worse then the disease) it cannot but sound very harshly in your ears. Man is not very willing to suffer, yea hardly can he be cast into such a condition, but he finds or at least fancies some door of hope, at which he thinks he might escape. It is not often changing either backward or forward, or various kinds of changes, which will administer relief; but an orderly, a rational change, a change fitly suited to the condition of that which changeth. If ye would move aright, nay so much as desire aright; ye must come to a true understanding of your condition. Do ye understand your selves? do ye act like men? or are ye led and driven up and down like brute Creatures? Have ye took notice what, this long season, hath been doing among you? Can ye tell me, whence ye came, whither ye are going, where ye now are? Shall I put you in minde?

Ye came from Slavery, *from such bonds and burthens as ye were very weary of. Ye are marching towards* Liberty, *thither is your intent to go, into a free state and condition where ye may have cause to complain no more of Oppression or burthens. But where are ye? Who knoweth that? Why surely ye are in an* entangled estate *and condition, wherein ye have lost your way, or at least the sight of it: Ye would fain return back or turn aside, but ye have no minde to go forward. Thus is it often in cases of this nature; The* wilderness, *the* way, *the* passage *to* Canaan *(the Land of Rest) is many times so grievous, that* Egypt, *even the Land of Bondage, seemeth more tolerable. That people was ready to stone* Moses *for leading them into such a perplexed condition, though* Moses *guided them faithfully. I do not compare your Leaders with* Moses *(yet it becometh you to remember, how strangely they were raised up to appear for you, when ye groaned under sharp and heavy pressures) I do not think them so weighty in the ballance: yet I doubt ye wreng them, when ye weigh them, your ballance not being right, nor you affording them their due allowances. They have met with real difficulties and straits, which hath made their way very uneven and hard to walk in: yea such a continued* series *of distracting occurrences and affairs may have tended to put them quite out of their way. Do ye consider this? I will tell you what I have much observed: Man is very*

prone

prone to do evil, to be unjust in every state and condition, to bend his trust aside, to neglect seeking and serving those whom he ought to seek and serve, improving that very advantage for the further seeking and serving of himself. This is usually the state of man, look on him where you will you shall finde him in this posture: but he that accuseth is commonly as unjust, if not more, in the accusation, then the other was in the transgression. The common people are most subject to this of any, who receive things by rumors and common reports, without examining or scanning whether things be so or no. This is the common miscarriage between Superiors and Inferiors: The one doth not govern righteously, the other doth not obey righteously: and yet they are both unjust in their complaints of each other; the Superior complaining in an unjust maner of the Inferiors Obedience, the Inferior complaining in as unjust a maner of the Superiors Government. If every man could once espy and grow most weary of his own faults, there might be some hope of amendment. This World is a strange Mystery of Iniquity *in the whole course of it, in every piece and parcel of it; every one being offended with each other, for adulterating in their intentions, motions and actions, and yet the mean while, as deeply, in the very same way, they themselves adulterating. If ye should encline to entertain this as a melancholly apprehension from my pen (for man is very difficult to hear the sound of ill concerning himself, and ready to throw dirt into the face of him from whom it comes) look into the Scripture, see if that do not speak expresly to the same purpose. Particularly into that* Rom. 2. 1. *where the words run thus.* Therefore thou art inexcusable, O Man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thy self, for thou that judgest dost the same things.

When this Scripture is opened in that light which penned it, who will be able to stand before it! What man is it that judgeth not another? and he that judgeth another thinketh himself free, at least in that respect wherein he judgeth another: but what is said here? O Man, thou that judgest art inexcusable. *Yes, will man say, such as judg rashly, such as judg unjustly: nay but the words here carry it further,* whosoever thou art that judgest. *Why what ground is there for this? Are not such and such things evil? doth*

not the person deserve to be judged for them? Yes, but not by thee, who art guilty with him of the same things, though thou seest it not, and so in judging him thou dost but condemn thy self; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thy self. *How can that be? I condemn onely those that do such and such things, but thanks be to God, though I have my failings, yet I am free from those things: I should not think my self worthy to live upon the face of the Earth, nay I should think my self fit for nothing but Hell if I were guilty of those things mentioned in the latter of the former Chapter. Thus thou sayst, this is thy testimony concerning thy self: but he who knoweth thee* (he who searcheth the heart and tryeth the reins) *accuseth thee for thy judging, telling thee that in so doing thou condemnest thy self, giving in this as the reason of it, because thou dost the same things:* for thou that judgest dost the same things: *If he cannot make this good against thee, thou shalt escape. Ah poor man, how art thou hid from thy self! thou knowest not what is written in thine heart (even all that which is mentioned in the latter end of the foregoing Chapter;) thou knowest not the way thy heart hath to bring forth these things; thou dost not know how or when thou dost them. When thy heart shall be opened by him who knoweth it, and these things plainly discovered to have been in thee, and drawn forth into act by thee; when both the root and the fruit shall be made as manifest as the day, what wilt thou say! Surely then O man, thou who hast been so confident and abundant in clearing thy self and accusing others, wilt grow* speechless, *and sink under thy treble condemnation, first for being and doing evil, then for justifying thy self, and lastly for condemning others.*

I must contract my self in what remains. Dear Country-men, *If I were able to speak* a word in season, *I would commend a little advice to you, but my condition maketh me unwilling to do it, yet your condition overswayeth me again, and extorteth it from me. It may perhaps, where it taketh root and springeth up, tend towards the setling of some spirits, and towards a sweet and orderly guiding of them in publique actings. For clearness sake, I shall branch it into a few Heads.*

1. *Apply your selves to be sensible what* true Freedom *is, wherein it lies, and of what value it is. It is of more worth then*

your Estates, yea then your Lives; and therefore deserves to be higher prized. It consists not in licentiousness, to do what ye will, nor in having no Taxes layd upon you (this may be necessary for your safety) but in these four things. First, in having good Laws, suited to your state and condition. Secondly, in a good method of Government, whereby ye may come to enjoy the benefit of all those Laws, and whereby your remedies of redress may be easie and cheap, not so hard to be come at, nor so costly, as commonly they are. Thirdly, in having a good Governor or Governors, who may faithfully oversee the execution of these Laws according to this method. Fourthly, in having a setled way of Parliaments, to amend, alter or add to in any kinde (as need shall require) these Laws, this method of Government, these Governors. And, which I might name a fifth, to have such a clear way, for these Parliaments to proceed in, as they might not easily miss: for otherwise, if the way be not very plain, such a Body of the common sort, who are not supposed either to be very skilful or experienced in Government, are likely to do a great deal more hurt then good.

2. *Be not weary of the pursuit after Liberty, because of the many difficulties and expences which it occasions. Undergo the pains of cure. What charge will a man be at, in a Suit of Law, to recover a peece of Estate? Is it not worth more to recover the Liberty of a man? The Nations of the Earth have still layn under Slavery, have not ye your selves felt it? Would ye not creep out, and do ye think to creep out with ease? The very casting of so great a burthen will make the Earth shake under you: Besides the opposition of such who finde advantage by riding upon your backs will heighten the difficulty of it. If ye will be cured of your Sickness by Physique, ye must suffer that Sickness which comes with Physique. O do not run into Slavery to avoyd a few present burthens, but pursue your Freedom, what ever it cost you. If ever ye come to enjoy it, ye will not think much of what ye have layd out for the purchase of it.*

3. *Eye not man, no not in those things wherein he appears as the main agent. Consider who it is that doth all, especially in such great changes. It is not the wit of man, the will of man, which manageth these things, but one above man. He speaketh Peace*

and Settlement to a Nation, and who then can speak Trouble or Disturbance? He also stirreth the mud in a Nation, and who then can settle it? He throweth down the mighty from their seat, exalting them of low degree; and he doth not give liberty to man to finde fault with him either for throwing down the mighty because he liked them, or for setting up them of low degree because he disliketh them. Read and consider that place Psal. 75. 7. *(and shew in practice, as well as in profession, that ye reverence Scripture)* GOD is THE JUDG, He putteth down one, and setteth up another. *Take heed what ye do: If ye had only man to deal with, ye might make your party good; but it is* hard kicking against the pricks. *It may be his design at present* (whose counsel shall stand, and who will fulfil all his pleasure) *as it was once concerning* Nebuchadnezzar, *to make you also sensible, that* the most High ruleth among the children of men, *disposing of* Kingdoms, Powers *and* Governments, *as and to whom he pleaseth.*

4. *Expect not help or satisfaction from man. Man hath no worth in him, and for this end may he be made use of, by God, to shew how vile and empty he is, how unable and unfit to produce any thing of value. Truly I have often thought, that the Powers and Governments of this World are intended, rather to make us weary of them, then to yeeld us satisfaction in them. This whole Creation is a meer peece of vanity, and (in all the changes of it) can yeeld but vanity: What do ye mean to raise such expectations, concerning any thing or from any thing in it? It may be the intent of God to discover to you (by multiplyed sense and experience) that man cannot help you: While your expectations are from man, or upon this or that change, ye are far from learning this lesson. I know means are appointed and made use of by God in the producing of effects, but sometimes he withers them, to divert our eyes from them, and to make us feel what empty, barren, imperfect things they are. While ye cry out so much against any means or instruments, on the one hand, or so much magnifie any, on the other hand (as every one almost doth according to his different esteem of them) ye cannot so fully be taken up with observing the principal Agent. If God intend himself to bestow what ye desire upon you, he may hold his hand while ye expect it from man: If God intend at last to put forth an excellent peece of strength*

and

and wisdom for your rescue, he may defer till he hath tired out yours: And if that should be his intention, ye are out of the way while your expectation is fastened elsewhere.

5. *And lastly; Groan and pant, unto him who is skilful to save, after your own deliverance and after the deliverance of his people. He who wanteth deliverance, and knoweth not where to obtain it; what is more proper for him, then to groan and pant after it? The whole Creation is continually in a condition of groaning and travelling after deliverance, not of enjoying it. Bear a part with the Creation, as ye are a part of it; yea the higher your extremities grow, the greater let your groans be. Be content with your travelling pangs, which is the common track and rode unto bringing forth.*

And groan likewise for the liberty of the sons of God: *for what do ye know but your Liberty may spring up with theirs?* Israel *is in bonds, the Lord hath* smitten *him, the Lord hath* hid his face *from him (yea the Lord hath made him* a reproach *and* by-word *among all the Heathen) and while he frowns upon him, he knows not how to smile upon any else. The people of God have ever had hard usage in this World, and particularly in this Nation. Can ye expect that God, who disposeth of all things, should be forward to give you your Liberties, while ye are not willing they should enjoy theirs? Can they submit to the Laws, Ordinances and Constitutions of man concerning their God, while an higher light is set up in them? No they cannot, though they were in the dark. If ye can be content and desire to do so, do so quietly, live your selves in* Egypt *if ye like it (and ye may better do it, for it will not be a Land of bondage to you) but* let my people go that they may serve me, *said God, concerning his people, when alas they knew not how to serve him. This is a ticklish point, and of more consequence to the welfare of Nations then they are aware of. Therefore if ye love your selves, your own Peace, your own Liberties, your own Happiness, beware of this; take heed of enthralling them in spiritual things, who were never in that respect (but only in outward, in things common to man) put under your yoke. But, in stead thereof, wish after their Liberty: and though ye cannot heartily desire it in respect to them, yet do it in reference to the enjoyment of your own your selves, because, for*

ought

ought ye know, yours may lie wrapped up in it.

All this have I spoken unto you, not from any design in me in reference to any thing or person: but truly and faithfully from my very heart commending unto you, what to me (in this my state of weakness) appears best for you. Which having done, I now take my leave of you, wishing you the best benefit this can afford, or rather the full fruition of that which this doth but weakly and imperfectly drive at, viz. the quietest enjoyment of your selves in your present condition, and the safest and swiftest passage to a better. This is the heart of him towards you, who earnestly desireth to be

Yours in true Love

and Faithful Service,

Isaac Penington (junior.)

THE

THE Right, Liberty and Safety OF THE PEOPLE Briefly Asserted.

THe *Right*, *Liberty* and *Safety* of the *People* lieth chiefly in these three things; in *the Choyce* of their Government and Governors, in *the Establishment* of that Government and those Governors which they shall chuse, and in *the Alteration* of either as they find cause. This belongs to every people (though few, if any, are in possession of it,) and that people, which enjoyeth these, enjoyeth its *Right*, is indeed *free* and *safe* while it so remaineth.

1. *The Right, Liberty and Safety of the People* consists in *the Choyce of their Government and Governors.*

It is their *Right*: for in *Civil Societies* Nature hath not cut out the *body* into form and shape, but hath left it to be done by the

 Will

will and Wisdom of man, having imprinted in him a sense of and desire after the enjoyment of *Justice, Order, Love, Peace* (and whatsoever else is good and profitable for him) both particularly in himself and in common with others; which desire throughly kindled in man, and guided by *the true light of Reason*, will lead man to chuse that which is properly good both for himself and others. And though man may possibly or probably abuse this, yet that is no sufficient ground for depriving him of his *right*.

Their *Liberty* lies in it too. They only are *a free People* who have their *Government* of their own choyce. Such upon whom others do intrude, or upon whom other *Laws* or *Regents* are imposed then what themselves judg meet and necessary, and besides that which they themselves voluntarily and by *free consent* submit unto for their good and welfare, are so far under slavery and such a miserable *subjection* as Nature never appointed them unto.

Their *Safety* likewise lies in it: for to be sure they will chuse nothing but what in probability will conduce to their own *good* and *happiness*; whereas others, making *Laws* for them, or setting *Governors* over them, may respect their own particular benefit and advantage, and not so much the good of the People, which is the main end why *Laws*, *Governments* and *Governors* are appointed, and to which they should in a direct line be guided.

And upon this ground I conceive it very requisite, that men who are chosen to sit in *Parliament* to make or alter *Laws*, to set up or alter *Governments* or *Governors* for and in behalf of *the People*, should, as soon as any, lie open to the force of all the *Laws* they make, or of any thing they do in that kind; that no *Law* they make should take effect till they be dissolved, and come to lie as liable to it as any, otherwise they will not be sensible enough of the Peoples *condition*, and consequently not fit to stand in their stead, or to act for them in cases that concern them so nearly. The greatest *security* the People have concerning their *Parliaments* is that they chuse persons whose condition will keep them from injurying them, for if they prejudice them they prejudice themselves, if they neglect their good they neglect their own good: This *security* is good while the people chuse them that are of their own *rank*, and while these make no *Laws* for them which shall have any *life* or *vertue* to do *good* or *hurt* till they come also to be exposed to them,

but

but otherwise it is very invalid, if not wholly lost. They who are to govern by *Laws* should have little or no hand in making the *Laws* they are to govern by: for Man respects himself in what he does; (The Governor will respect himself, his own ease, advantage and honour in Government, and lay loads upon the people, but make his own burthen light:) Therefore things should be so ordered, in the behalf and for the security of the people, that such as are chosen and appointed to act in this kind should lay no *load* upon the people, but what their own backs may come as soon and as fully, in their degree and station, to bear, as any of the peoples.

2. *The Right, Liberty and Safety of the People* consists in *the Establishment of their Government and Governors.* As they have right to chuse, so they have right to confirm what they chuse, to establish that *Government* and such kind of *Governors* as they judg or find most convenient and necessary for them. Without this the people can be neither *free* nor *safe* no more then without the other, nay without this their *right to chuse* would be to little purpose, the end of choyce in things of this nature being for the *duration* of its appointed season.

3. Their *Right*, *Liberty* and *Safety* lieth also in enjoying and exercising (as need requires) *the Power of altering their Government or Governors*: that when they find either burdensom or inconvenient they may lay it aside, and place what else they shall judg lighter, fitter or better in the stead of it. *Nature* still teacheth every thing, as it groweth, to reach further and further towards *perfection*. No man is bound to that which he chuseth or establisheth further then he findeth it suitable to the *end* for which he chose and established it: Now several *states* and *conditions* of things and persons changing, there must of necessity be an answerable change in *Laws*, *Orders*, *Governments* or *Governors* also, or man will be instrumental to introduce *slavery*, *misery and tyranny* upon himself, which Nature teacheth every thing both to abhor, and as much as may be to avoyd.

It is the desire of most men both in reference to *Church and State* (as men commonly speak) to have *Laws* and *Ordinances*, after the manner of the *Medes and Persians*, which cannot be altered: I cannot but approve the desire, since it is written in mans *na-*

ture. It is natural to man, and a *stamp* of the *divine Image* upon him, to press after *unchangeableness* both in himself and in the things which appertain unto him: But yet it is not suitable to his *present condition* which will in no wise admit of it, because it is continually subject to change and alteration: And as it still changeth, so do his *needs* and *desires*, as also his *experience* and *wisdom*, and so must the *Laws and Orders* which he prescribes to himself and others, or he will be grievously cruel to himself and others. *Ages* have their *growth* as well as particular persons, and must change their *garments*, their *Customs*, their *courses*, &c. for those which are still suitable to their present state and growth. *Laws* are but *temporary*; and as they are founded upon *Reason*, so they are no longer to last then *the Reason* of them lasteth, to which they ought to give place, and admit of such a *succession* as it appoints. Only herein hath *Nature* provided well for *the people*, if they could fairly come to their Right, and had wisdom to use it (which sense and experience is continually instructing them how to do) in that she doth allot them to make and alter their own *clothes*, to shape out their own *burdens*, to form, renew or alter that *yoke of Government* which is most necessary and convenient for their necks.

All this, or any part of this *(either the chusing, establishing or altering Governments, Laws or Governors)* the people cannot do in a Body; an whole *Nation* is too unweildy to act together themselves: therefore *Nature* hath taught them to do it by *Substitutes*, whom they themselves chuse to stand in their stead to do any of these things for them as their present *condition* and *need* requires, which Body of persons is with us called a *Parliament*, who are picked out by the whole to be the *Representative* of the whole, to do that for the whole which they would have to be done, and would do themselves if they were a Body in a *capacity* to act.

And from this first *rise* of things may best be discovered the *nature, ends, proper use and limits of Parliaments*, all which are necessary to be known, both that they may move according to their *nature*, pursue their *ends*, be rightly *used*, keep within their *compass*, and that the people may clearly discern that they so do, whereby they will come to rest satisfied in their *proceedings*, and in their *expectations* of good thereby.

We

We see here of what kind of *persons* the *Parliament* is to consist, *viz.* of *the common people*, that they may be fit to represent their burdens and desires.

We see here of what *use* and for what *end* they are, *viz. to relieve the people*, to redress any occasion of *grief* or *burden* to them, to make *Laws*, alter *Laws*, set *Laws* in a due way of *Administration*, set up or alter *Governments* and *Governors*, dispose of every thing in such a way as the people may freely enjoy their *Rights* in Peace and Safety.

We see also their *bounds* in general, *viz.* the exercising *the power of the People* in such ways as were proper for the people to exercise it in were they capable of joynt and orderly acting.

We see likewise their *Nature* or *Constitution*, what they are. They are *the ELECTIVE POWER, the CONSTITUTIVE POWER, the ALTERATIVE POWER.* What lies confused and unuseful in the people is treasured up in them in order, and in a fitting way for use. Is there a *Government* wanting? The people cannot orderly or wisely debate or chuse that which is likely to be most commodious and safe. Are there any *Laws* wanting? The people cannot well set about making Laws. Are there any *Laws*, *Customs*, or *Encroachments* burdensom? The people cannot rightly scan how far they are so, or proceed to a regular alteration of them. So that the whole *Right*, *Freedom*, *Welfare* and *Safety* of the People consists in *Parliaments* rightly and duly called, constituted and ordered towards acting faithfully in the discharge of the Trust reposed in them.

Yea lastly, Here we may see in a direct line *the proper course and way of Parliaments*, which speaks out it self, and would easily be discerned by us, if our eyes were kept fixed here, and not entangled with other intermixtures, which are apt to seize upon every thing, and interweave with every thing, hardly any thing keeping its own pure *nature* or proper *current*. Take it thus, (with a little kind of Circuit for the better illustration of it, yet very briefly.)

All *Governments* (though intended for and directed towards common good) are still declining and contracting private, selfish and corrupt *Interests*, whereby the people come to feel *burdens* under them, and find want of *fences* to guard them from the *insolencies* and *assaults* of such as are above them, which are very usual

every where, for every man (I think I need not add, almost) though he be unwilling to have any tyrannize over him, yet he is too prone to tyrannize over such as are under him. Who would not, when he feels *oppression*, if he were able, thrust the *Oppressor* out of his *seat*? and yet who sees how ready he himself would be, so soon as he hath done it, to seat himself in the same *throne of oppression*; and that he will as certainly do the one as the other, if he be not hindered by *outward force*, or (which is better) by an *inward principle*? Indeed man can by no means come to see this concerning himself, but the people still come too soon to feel it.

Now the People, who wear their *Government*, finding *by experience* where it sitteth easie or pincheth, what present *loads* they groan most under, what future *fences* they stand in need of to shelter them from the injurious assaults of *Powers* above them; accordingly chuse *persons*, who lie under the same sense with them, to represent, consult about, and redress these their *grievances*, by *punishing Offenders* for misdemeanors past, by *opening the course of Law* for time to come, as also by *adding* thereto, or *detracting* therefrom, as the condition and need of the people requires, &c.

These persons thus chosen are to come with the sense and desires of the particular *Counties, Cities or Boroughs* for which they serve, mutually to represent these, and to consult together how all *burthens* may be taken off, and all *desires* satisfied in such a way as may stand with the *good* of the whole.

After full *debate* had how these things may be done, to come to an *agreement* of full *setling* them accordingly in the *firmest way* that can be, which having done to *dissolve*, and leave the people experimentally to try and reap the benefit of their *care, pains* and *fidelity*, and to return immediately into their former *condition*, to lie with them sensibly again under the *benefit* or *inconvenience* of what they have done.

And this to be done with as much *speed*, as the motion of such a kind of Body, in Affairs so weighty, can permit; that if they chance to fail in effecting what is desired and expected from them, the people may quiet themselves with the expectation of another *remedy* in its season approaching. The reason why *Parliaments* should with all possible speed dispatch their work, is for avoyding of that *corruption* which *standing pools* are subject to, and which is

most

most dangerous in *them*; for what shall rectifie *the last remedy*, if that be out of order, and grow so corrupt, that it hath more need of a *Physician* it self, then to act the part of a *Physician*? All things by degrees gather *corruption*, the *governing Power* by degrees declineth from its first purity, and so also doth the *rectifying* and *reforming Power*, its *deviation* is as easie as the others, and of far greater consequence; more *destructive*, less *curable*. Therefore better were it for *Parliaments* to leave part of their work undone, then to sit so long as to contract *corruption*: It is better to want somewhat of the full *application* of a *remedy*, then to have it poysoned. But of this more by and by under a distinct head by it self.

Now the whole *Right, Liberty, Welfare and Safety* of the People consisting in *Parliaments*; the right *Constitution* and orderly *motion* of them is of the greatest consequence that can be, there being so much embarqued in this *Vessel*, where, if it miscarry, it is irreparably lost, unless it can be recovered again out of the *Sea* of *Confusion*.

Wherefore it becometh every one (both in reference to himself and the whole) to contribute his utmost towards the right steering of *this Vessel*, towards the preserving of it pure both in its *state* and *motions*, lest both the *good and Welfare* of the *Whole* and of every *particular* miscarry, for want of due care and observation.

Towards which work, the further to incite and provoke others, I cast in this present *offering*, making mention of those *dangers* which lie open to my eye in reference to *Parliaments*, whereby the *true and genuine fruit* of them may either be hindered from *growth*, or come to be *corrupted*, whereby the People at least cannot but miss of the proper use and benefit, which it ought to reap from them.

There are, in reference to Parliaments, six *Cases* or *Considerations*, evident to me, whereby the hazard of the people may be very great, which I shall set down distinctly that they may be the better taken notice of, weighed and judged.

1. *Want of Parliaments.* Parliaments are the proper *Remedy* to relieve the *grieved People* from their *burdens and oppressions*; from any kind or the several kinds of oppressions that may befall them

them; from the oppressions of any *Government*, any *Governors*, any *Laws*, any *Incroachments*, &c. (for by several ways, means and instruments the people may be oppressed.) Now if *Parliaments* be wanting, that is to say, be not duly called according to the need of the people (it being their *proper engine* whereby alone they can duly, orderly and safely act) their *Right*, *Liberty* and *Safety* is much hazarded, and they obnoxious to lie under the burden of oppression without remedy. If *diseases* grow, and a due *course of physique* be not to be had, the body cannot but suffer damage and hazard.

There are two things essentially necessary to the health and well-being of a *Nation*, as well as of other bodies both *natural* and *politique*, which are, the cutting off of exuberances, and the supplying of defects, both which in the principal and most weighty part of them, are peculiar to *Parliaments*; so that where there is want of them, the *radical life and vertue* of the people must needs be obstructed, languish and decay. This is a very ill disease, how ever those who never knew or experimented the sweetness of enjoying their *Right* and *Liberty*, may not be considerably sensible of it.

2. *Want of fair Elections*, as thus, If the people be by any means drawn from minding their own good, from bending themselves to chuse persons who may be fit to act for them. How easily may *Parliaments* warp aside from easing and relieving the people unto further burthening and grieving of them, if such persons be chosen to appear in their behalf, who are friends to their Oppressors, and have a particular advantage of sharing with them in the benefit of that which is the burden and cause of grief to the people? And here is a great danger the people are very obnoxious to: Their burdens commonly arise from the miscarriage of the still *present Governors*, and these Governors cannot but have great advantages, by their Power over them, to have an influence upon their choyce. Therefore if the people be not so much the more wary, that which was intended for their greatest *relief* may turn to their greatest *prejudice*. O how miserable is man, whose remedies against multitudes of dangers are so few, and even those few all along so subject to miscarry! A *Parliament* may be prevented, that it may not be to be had when there is most need of it: A *Parliament* may be corrupt before it hath a Being, it may be so ill constituted in respect of the *materials* of it, that it may be a fitter engine of slavery and misery

misery then of freedom and happiness to a poor enthralled people. And yet this is not all the danger that *Parliaments* are exposed unto, as also the people, in relation to that good they hope for by *Parliaments.*

3. *Short continuance of Parliaments.* Suppose the people have *Parliaments*, have a fair and free choyce without being over-powered therein, or swayed aside; nay suppose yet more, that they chuse well for themselves; yet *the Power* they are to deal with may overbear them, and (if they cannot bend them aside) enforce their *dissolution.* And hereby the people must needs be deprived of reaping that good they desired and hoped for by their endeavors.

Parliaments are *great Bodies*, and consequently *slow* in motion, which is their proper pace and advantage, for they can hardly do any thing well but what they do slowly; for motions that require swiftness *Nature* hath cut out other kind of bodies. Again, *Parliaments* are to act very *warily*, (as the things they are to do, are of great concernment, and require much *circumspection* and *consideration*,) and therefore in both these respects must have time convenient to act accurately in the discharge of *so great a Trust*, and in the managing of *so weighty Affairs*, which if it be not answerably allotted them, they must of necessity be defective in.

4. *Want of Power to Parliaments.* Parliaments have a difficult piece of work, *viz. to chastise the greatest Oppressors, and to strike at the very root and foundation of oppression* in any kind, and unless they have Power answerable they cannot possibly go through with it. *Oppositions* and *interruptions* from *other Powers* they must expect to meet with, which if they be not able to grapple with and overcome, they cannot exercise the full Right and Liberty of the People, either in *punishing Offenders against the People*, or in *chusing, establishing or altering Governments, Laws or Governors* for the People. This must necessarily much hinder, if not put a stop to their work: for if any fall short of those means which are proper to an end, they cannot possibly attain that end: If the hand which imposeth and would keep burthens upon the back, be stronger then that which would remove them; If the hand which would supply defects, be weaker then that which stands in its way to stop it in its course, vain and fruitless will all its endeavors be. (The Power

 that

that relieveth from oppression must of necessity be greater then the Power that oppresseth.) And this was the condition of this present *Parliament*, there was visibly such a *Power* over them as they could do nothing to purpose for the good of the People; This doubtless they had great reason to strive to get loose from, and the people had great reason to stick to them in it, as also to expect from them their own freedom after they were made free, the freedom of the people being the end (theirs but the means,) and therefore most to be eyed. 'Tis to no purpose at all to have never so free a *Parliament*, unless we have also a *People* put into the possession of their freedoms by the *Parliament*.

5. *Over-long-duration of Parliaments.* This was glanced at before, but yet it will be requisite to consider of it further, because after those many changes which of late we have been much driven and necessitated into, we may at present lie more open to the *ill influence* of this, then of any of the former: and it should be the especial wisdom and care of man to take most heed of that danger which he lieth most open to. Every thing hath its *appointed seasons*, *bounds* and *proper way of operation*, within which it is very beautiful and profitable, but beyond it very uncomely and dangerous. *Parliaments*, in their season, may bring forth a most sweet and excellent kind of fruit, which may vigorously refresh the spirits, and recover the decaying Liberties of a dying *Nation*; but continuing longer then its season, the *Root it self* may easily grow corrupt, and *the fruit* prove sowre, harsh, and deadly, yea may tend to a more bitter death then it was ordained to prevent. Many dangers *Parliaments* are exposed to by long continuance, whereby their *nature and constitution* may be depraved, or they induced to act after a different nature, or in other ways then is proper for them, or good for the people. Those dangers which more principally in this respect represent themselves to my eye, I shall here make mention of.

1. *Parliaments*, by long continuance, will be subject to fall into *factions*, which is the foundation of so many breaches and divisions in the whole, upon which they cannot but have an influence to conform them unto themselves, the eye of the people being still upon the *fountain-head*. We have had sufficient experience to evidence the truth of this, for still as the *Parliament* hath been divided, there

have

have also been divisions throughout the whole *Nation*. Persons who act joyntly and uniformly at first, (having one and the same *sense* upon their spirits, one and the same *end* in their eye, one and the same *desire* in their hearts) may in process of time lose this *sense*, this *desire*, this *end*, and be drawn aside to another *sense*, *desire*, *end*, and differ also in their new choyce, which may insensibly creep in upon them ; and according to this difference, there will ensue a division among them both in their motions and actions. Now how dangerous this is to have a breach *in the Root*, to have a seed of division *in the heart*, working there, springing forth from thence, and diffusing it self throughout the whole body, I think it will be needless to express.

2. Parliament men, by the long continuance of a *Parliament*, will be exposed to the temptation of *seeking themselves*, of minding and prosecuting their several particular *ends* and *interests*. A Parliament man, as he is chosen to be, so he should set himself to be *a publique person*, as it were forgetting himself, and giving up himself to be taken up only with the *publique good*, for the season of this work. This a good *Patriot* may find somewhat easie to do for a while, but if the *Parliament* last long, Self which is very strong in him, and may challenge a right to be looked after, will revive its right, pleading both *reason* and *necessity* in its own behalf. That man, that could be content to lay all aside, and bend himself wholly for the publique for a short time, cannot hold out in doing so, but will be enforced to look after himself, his own affairs, his own profit and thriving in the world, &c. And when he comes to manage these and the other together, it will be very difficult for him to avoyd making use of that advantage, which both his power and the long continuance of it affords him, towards his own particular benefit. And Self, having thus crept in, will grow more and more upon him, and will be continually, secretly and subtilly drawing him more and more towards himself, and more and more from the publique : and killing those affections in him (which are too apt of themselves to do) which were very lively at first for the publique, and consequently much unfit him for his work.

3. *Parliaments* by long continuance are in danger of contracting *a particular Interest* (an Interest distinct from that Interest which they have as a part of and in common with the people) in the *publique*

lique Government. Every man hath an allowable *Interest* in common with the whole, so that if it goeth well with the whole, every one shares in it: This is a good, a profitable Interest, no way prejudicial to any else. But then there is *a particular Interest*, whereby it may go well with some, though ill with the generality; nay the welfare of some may arise out of the incommodity of the generality; That wind which bloweth ill upon the publique, may blow profit to some. This *Interest* all Powers do readily contract to themselves, partly by their own *strength*, and partly by their advantage to winde into other Powers, the greater still bringing the less into subjection, which must be at its command and use, or be broken by it. This snare which other Powers by their continuation are still running into, the *Parliament* is to redeem and purge them from; but to take heed lest their own continuance should be so long, as to bring them into the same snare; which may both *unfit them for their proper Work*, which is to be Judges on the behalf of the Commonwealth, which how can they truly execute, who have a particular interest and share of their own (besides that which they have in common with the people) in the present Government, whom as it favours, so they must again favour it? As also it may *engage them in an improper Work, viz.* in becoming Administrators in the present Government, which is no way proper for such as are appointed to be the Judges of Administrators and Administrations.

A *Parliament* have an interest in the Government with the rest of the people, yea a right and power conferred upon them by the people to *order, settle, amend*, or (if need be) *new-make* the Government for themselves and the people; but not to meddle with the *administration* of it, or to endeavor to bend it aside, in the *administration* of it, for any particular end or advantage of their own; which their Power may easily do, and which their over-long-duration may too much intice them to assay to do.

4. *Parliaments*, by long continuance, may incur the danger of interrupting if not of swallowing up the *ordinary course* of the peoples enjoying their *Right* in obtaining *speedy, free and impartial Justice* by the administration and execution of the Laws. The greater doth commonly weaken, if not devour the less. Extraordinary remedies are apt to thrust into the place of the ordinary, especially when by long duration they may seem to challenge to themselves

ſelves the right of becoming ordinary.

5. (Which is worſt of all) *Parliaments*, by over-long-duration, may ſlip into danger of depriving the people of the proper uſe and benefit of Parliaments. The proper uſe of Parliaments is to be a *curb* to the extravagancy of Power, of the *higheſt ſtanding Power*: But if they themſelves become *the ſtanding Power*, how can they be a fit curb for it? A *Parliament* is to be ſuch a Body as may have the ſenſe of the people upon them, that ſo they may be led by that ſenſe to eaſe, relieve and ſafeguard the people: But if once they become *Governors*, they will loſe that ſenſe, and have a ſenſe of a different nature upon them: They will (like other Governors) have a ſenſe of the *duty* of the people which they owe to their Governors, but loſe (by degrees, ſtill more and more) their ſenſe of the *burthens* and *grievances* of the People. So that if Parliaments ſucceed in the place of the *ſupream-adminiſtring-power*, there will be as much need of ſomewhat elſe to ſtand between the people and them, as there was of them to ſtand between the people and *Kingly Power*: for they coming into that place and Authority, the people are in as much danger of them, as they were of the Power of Kings: for it is not the perſon ſimply, but the power, wherein the danger or benefit lieth. And this doubtleſs is the *Right* and *Liberty* of the People, and herein lieth their *Safety*, *viz.* to have an *extraordinary, legiſlative, alterative, corrective Power* above the *ordinary ſtanding Power*; and this Power, as to conſiſt of *the Body of the People*, ſo likewiſe to be kept altogether free from having any particular *hand in Government*, (but to keep within the bounds of their own extraordinary work, which is not ſo much in as about Government,) that ſo they may both have and retain the ſenſe of the people, being engaged by their ſtate and condition to do nothing which may prejudice the people, becauſe in caſe they do, they themſelves will ſuddenly feel the ſmart of it.

6. The laſt *danger*, which I ſhall at this time mention in reference to *Parliaments*, is this. *The aſſuming a Power of a different nature from them, not proper to them; and intermedling with a Work which they are not fitted for, entruſted with, or appointed to.*

Powers, like other things (and ſomewhat more advantagiouſly

then other things, having stronger hands) are still gathering in to themselves. The rich man will be gathering riches, the wise man will be gathering wisdom, and the powerful man will be gathering power: And in attracting to himself (especially where he is the *sole Judg*) it is very difficult for him to be *moderate* or *innocent*. He who hath a right power in some things, it is hard for him to keep there, and not to seek after and lay hold on, if he can, that power which he ought not to have, and in those other kind of things wherein he ought not to have power. That a *Parliament*, as well as other *Powers*, is subject to this temptation, cannot be denyed.

This is dangerous every where. (To have things endowed with a different, if not contrary nature, to have things employed about a different, if not a contrary work to neglect their own work for which they are fit, to which they are appointed, and execute another work for which they are not fit, to which they are not appointed; this, let it be never so carefully and faithfully managed, must needs bring *disorder*, *confusion*, nay greater *inconveniences*.) But the greater the power is, the greater is the danger: because as the greatest power may do most good in its own way, so it may do most harm in a wrong way. *Powers* that are great, bring forth great effects either of *Peace* or *Trouble*, *Order* or *Confusion*, *Salvation* or *Destruction*. No remedy so soveraign, so restorative as a *Parliament* rightly constituted, rightly applyed, and rightly acting: No disease more deadly, more consuming the very *heart-life* of the Rights and Liberties of a Nation, then a *Parliament* misconstituted, misapplyed, misacting.

But every one here will be ready to say, What is *that Power* which is proper to *Parliaments*? what is their *proper Work*? what is that Power of a different nature, which will be so dangerous for them to assume? and what is that work, which they are not fitted for, entrusted with, or appointed to?

To satisfie the desire of such as may greedily enquire after this, I shall answer somewhat, according to that insight which is afforded me into the nature of things, shewing (from the *Principles* foregoing) both what their proper *Power* and *Work* is, and then what *Power* and *Work* is improper for them. And it is a clearer and far

far safer way, to search out and discover things from their first rise in Nature, then from succeeding *Principles* or *Practises*, which may easily decline awry and cover the true knowledg and intent of things.

Now concerning their proper *Power* and *Work*, I shall not undertake to define the particular limits of it, it will suffice to my purpose, to express the general nature of it, which to me appeareth thus.

It is a *NATURAL* (*Humane* or *Civil*) *EXTRAORDINARY*, *CONSTITUTIVE*, *CORRECTIVE*, *ALTERATIVE POWER*. I shall speak chiefly of their *Power*, which will of it self discover their *Work*, therefore that will not need so particularly to be opened.

First, I say it is *NATURAL*: such a Power as is sown in *man*, in the *nature* of man. Man hath a power over himself, to dispose of himself, according to that wisdom and righteousness which is seated in him, grows up with him (if it be not blasted or kept under,) which he further attains to, or is in a further degree bestowed upon him. Of this common kinde is this, with all other earthly Powers.

But this expresseth onely the *kinde* of it, we are yet far from the *particular nature*, *end*, or *use* of it.

Therefore to describe it further, I term it *EXTRAORDINARY*, which it discovers it self to be, being a thing not for common and constant use, but for extraordinary ends and purposes; and the nature of things must be suited to their end, for thither it is to direct them.

Then more particularly there is expressed what kinde of extraordinary Power it is, namely, *CONSTITUTIVE*, *CORRECTIVE*, *ALTERATIVE*: It is a Power of setting up or establishing Laws, Governments, Governors; of correcting them, of altering them.

This is the nature of their Power, which pointeth out their work so plainly, as it will not need more particularly to be specified in this place.

Now by this there are two sorts of Power cut off from them, one whole kinde of Power, and one main branch of another kinde.

1. *Spiri-*

1. *Spiritual Power*, which claimeth its descent from *Christ as the Head of his Church*, and is appropriated by its nature, end and use, unto his Body the Church, which is his *City* or *Kingdom*, to be governed by him, even by that power of his *Spirit* which he pleaseth to exercise upon them, whether immediately by himself, or mediately by such as he substituteth under him. This Power, as it is *spiritual*, so it is fit to be managed onely by *spiritual* hands: Not by *Men*, but by *Christians*; nor by every Christian, but by such onely as can clear the derivacy of it from *Christ* to them, such as are fitted and appointed by him to be under him in his own seat and place of Government. Nor are Christians to exercise this Government over other men, but onely over Christians, whom alone it is suited to. Nor are they to govern as men; by outward force; but as Christians, by spiritual vertue and efficacy upon the Conscience, the seat of *Christ* in man, so that it may appear that not they, but *the Spirit of Christ*, *the Spirit in Christ*, doth rule and govern. O how sweet would this Government be! how pleasant to a Christian the strictest execution of the sharpest Laws in it! *Christs yoke is easie, and his burthen is light*, even in the sharpest and weightiest part of it.

But this Power belongeth not to any *Nation* or People under Heaven, there being not any Nation or People which can evidence the fair and clear derivacy of this Power from *Christ* to them: (as it was not intended for any Nation or People, save onely *his own Nation, his own People.*) Therefore not to any *Parliament*, who are but the People in a representative Body, in a Body contracted into a narrower compass for the use and service of the People; who as they stand in their stead, so they have onely their Power. The People being the stock or root from whence their Power and Authority doth spring, it can rise no higher, nor be of any other nature, then that which is in the People.

2. In *Civil Power*, the administrative or governing part of it appeareth from hence not to appertain to them.

In *Civil Societies*, as well as in *natural*, Nature hath cut out the proportion (in general, though not in particular.) There is *the Head* and *the Members*, having each their several innate *Properties*, *Motions*, *Laws* and *Priviledges*, which cannot be transgressed without violence to Nature, or without danger to that Body

Body or Society which breaketh the bounds limited by Nature. In every Society which is orderly, there is the Head and the Members; part to govern, and part to be governed; to each of which appertain their particular Rights: to the one such as they may be advantaged for and in government by; to the other such as they may be advantaged under government by; that the *yoke* may be gently, orderly, and sweetly managed by the one, and sweetly born by the other.

Now this is most evident, that the People are *the Body*, the People are *to be governed*; not to be *the Head*, not *to govern*. The *Legislative Power* indeed belongs to them, that their yoke might be the more easie: But the *Administrative Power* doth in no wise belong to them, but to those who are to govern. And though the People might be flattered and encouraged, from sense of the misuse of this Power, to take it into their own hands, yet it can never thrive there: and though they should set themselves to rest content, nay to please themselves with it; yet you must needs grow weary of it, and that very quickly, the inconveniences will multiply so fast, and grow so unavoydable.

Parliaments are the Body of the People, chosen by the People to stand for them, to represent them, to act in their stead: Answerably, They have that Power which is proper to the People, the *Legislative*, the *Supremely-Judicative*; but not that Power which belongs not to the People, *viz.* the *Administrative*.

In like maner this discovers a double kinde of work improper for them.

The one is, *medling with spiritual affairs*. The *constituting* of these, the *amending* of these, the *altering* of these is onely proper to such as are invested with *spiritual Power and Authority*. The *Laws* of *Christ* were never appointed to be set up by the Power of man, but by the *Power of his Spirit* in the *Conscience*. It is accounted profane, and much startled at, to touch that which man hath *made holy*, which man hath *separated* and consecrated to *divine use*; and yet how propense are, almost all persons, to be laying hands on that, *which God hath made holy and set a part* for himself! How sad an effect we have seen and felt from undertakings in this kinde, cannot but be fresh in our memories; what a sad *breach* and *division* it hath occasioned throughout the whole

 Nation

Nation, and particularly in the *Parliament*. Nor can I conceive readily, how it could be otherwise; The closest bond of union mistaken and misapplyed must needs become the greatest instrument of division (to let pass Gods interest to blast men, when they will be venturing upon that work which he hath not appointed them unto, but reserved for himself.) The wound thus made may prove incurable. Men differing in their judgments, and consequently in their desires; differing in the apprehension of their duties; their motions and endevors must needs run cross and become irreconcilable, while the foundation of this difference remains. While a man is strongly perswaded, that this or this is the way and Will of God, that it is his duty to use the utmost of his abilities, opportunies and advantages for the promoting of it. that this is the main end for which power is put into his hands, the chief thing God expects from him, and will call him to a very strict account about the improving of all his power and interest unto the advancing of this; I say while things stand thus, how can he with the quiet of his Conscience neglect acting accordingly? The *Presbyterian* is now engaged indissolubly, to use his utmost strength and endevor towards the advancing of *Presbytery*, which is Gods instituted way of Worship in his eye; and so the *Independent* of *Independency*, which is Christs Institution in his eye. Now having tasted so much of this, and smarted so much by this, men should be very wary of intermedling in things of this nature, further then their ground is clear.

The other is, *The taking upon them the Administration of Government, or intermixing with the administration of Government.* This is the most pernicious thing to a *Parliament* that can be, for it both diverteth them from their own work, and out of their own way, into one of another nature; and so thrusteth them into a necessity of doing disservice, and into an incapacity of doing service. This may make useless, nay may make burthensom, the best constituted *Parliament*. Suppose a *Parliament* of never such entire-hearted-honest-men, most studiously bent and applying themselves to publique service; yet if they be over-full of another kind of business then their own, or intermix another kinde of business with their own, they can neither well dispatch that other kinde of business which they are so over-full of, or which they so intermix; nor

their

their own neither. And it is the ready way to turn the hearts of the People from *Parliaments*: for finding things go so grievously amiss (as by this means they needs must,) and in the hands too of such men, as they can hardly hope for better, they will begin to look on a *Parliament* no longer as a *remedy*, but as a worse *disease*, then that which they addressed themselves to it for cure of. O consider your share, ye who are in danger of it! How prone was the *Administrative* Power to intrench upon the bounds of the *Legislative*, and how afflictive did it become thereby! Is not the *Legislative* Power as prone to intrench upon the *Administrative?* and in so doing, is it not likely to prove as afflictive?

Look into *Nature*, See if ever this kinde of Body was cut out, fitted or appointed by it to govern. It hath not a fit form or shape for it; it is unweildy for such a kinde of motion.

Again, Look into *the tenor of your Call and Trust*: Were ye ever entrusted herewith by the People? Is it, or ever was it, the minde of the People? Did they chuse you for this end? Have ye a *Commission* from them, I mean not formally, but so much as vertually, intentionally? They called you to rectifie Government, that is clear enough; but did they call you to govern? O remember, remember, when any such motions arise in you, when any such temptations beset you; Ye are not fitted to it by Nature: your motion is slow, but the work and way of Government requires speed and swiftness; And if ye should from a desire, from an apprehension of advantage, from sense of present need, or any other never so good an intent, alter your own slow pace and strive to act swiftly; it will quickly appear how uncomely it is in you, and how unsafe for the People. Remember also, that ye are not called to it by the People: and if ye will yet be venturing upon it, doubtless ye will run the hazard of ruining both your selves and the People.

These are some of the *dangers* which *Parliaments* (and through them the People) are obnoxious to. How far *this present Parliament* hath been overtaken with any of them, or how far the People hath suffered thereby, I shall not take upon me to determine. Only thus much I cannot but express, That *the present state of affairs* is (to my eye) much *entangled*, and that *the true foundations of Right and Freedom* (so far as I can discern) are not yet layd; and I could

 earnestly

earnestly desire and much entreat those in whose power it is, to do *the main work*, and to do it throughly: To let fall all desire of *Power or Supremacy* (whose sweetness will be tempting the best) to strike at the root of all *particular Interests* which stand in the way of *publique good*, and to set upon such ways of publique good, so evidently and directly tending thereto, as might be forcible to convince very *enemies* to them by their clearness in reason, and by the sweet benefit which they should not be able to avoyd tasting and reaping from them. Having such advantage of Power in their hands, what is it which might not be done for publique good, if men had hearts, and were in a right way?

It is commonly said, that *a stander by may see more then a gamester*: which if it be true, I may assume unto my self some freedom of speech more then ordinary, my condition interessing me in it. For I have been long taken off from being an *Actor* in any kinde, to become only a *Spectator*; yea and I think I may say safely, not an engaged but a free Spectator. I have not been interessed in the designs of any party whatsoever, nor so much as in desire to have any party thrive, further then they have been guided by *Principles* of *Reason* and *Righteousness* unto common good. There is not one sort of men upon the face of the Earth, to whom I bear any enmity in my spirit (though in some respect I must confess my self an enemy to every sort of men) but wish, with all my heart, they might all attain and enjoy as much *Peace*, *Prosperity*, and *Happiness*, as their state and condition will bear. There are not any to whom I should envy *Government*, but, who ever they are, they should have my vote on their behalf, whom I saw fitted for it and called to it. Indeed I am offended, very much offended with most persons and things, and I have a deep Charge against them, which at present I keep secret, not intending to bring it forth till I come upon that stage where I may have fair play. Yet thus much I will say, which toucheth a little upon it. I am offended both with *Light* and *Darkness*, or rather with that which pretends to be Light, and that which is acknowledged to be Darkness. *I am offended with that which pretends to be Light*, because it doth not more fairly overcome Darkness; but while it blames it for its dark paths of *Tyranny*, *Cruelty* and *Oppression*, it self seeks (not by the pure vertue and power of Light, but) by the same weapons, *viz.* of

dark

dark violence to conquer it; and if it ever prevail this way to do it effectually, I shall be much mistaken. *I am* also *offended with Darkness*; because it is not *true* to it self, not *just* to it self, not *at peace* with it self, nor keeps within the *sphere* of its own *dark Principles* (even those which it doth acknowledg) in its own motions, or in its opposing either Light or Darkness *Christians* dishonour themselves and their Principles; They speak indeed of *the Light of God*, of *the Life of God*, of *the Power of God*, of *the great Name of God*, but are fallen short of the true *vertue* and *glory* of all these, both in *Religion*, and in their *course* in the World. *Men* dishonor themselves and their Principles, falling short of that *common love*, *good will* and *righteousness* which very Nature would teach them to observe, notwithstanding its depravation, were their ears open. But I delight neither to complain nor accuse, onely I cannot but wish that all cause and occasion of complaint and accusation were taken away from him who doth delight in either. All the liberty I shall now make use of, is onely freely to express what I conceive necessary, in the present confused state of things, to reduce them into some certain safe and well-grounded order, according to plain Principles of Reason and Righteousness, without aiming either at the throwing down or setting up of any person or thing: Which, what interpretation soever of weakness, folly or disaffection may be put upon it, I finde not my self very prone to value. This *temper* hath long attended my spirit, not much to regard, what account either I my self or any else put upon things, but rather to expect what things will then appear to be, when they shal be made manifest by *that Light*, which doth discover them as they are, and will pass such a *judgment* upon them as they deserve, and shall not be able to gainsay or avoyd.

It is a kinde office and a commendable peece of service to help out of the mire, or to offer so to do, yet can hardly be so esteemed by him who observeth not himself to be in the mire, and consequently hath no sense of any need of help: He will rather entertain it with disdain then acceptation, it implying him to be in such a condition as he is unwilling to own or acknowledg. But however, as I have on the one hand expressed my sence (though very sparingly) of our present *entangled condition*, wherein we finde

our selves at a loss in our very *remedy*: so I shall on the other hand offer what help my Reason and Judgment presents to me as proper and necessary to dis-involve us and bring us into a right course.

To come then to what I drive at, first I shall speak a word in general towards setling, and then propound more particularly, what things are needful (considering our present state) towards the setling of affairs in order, justice and safety, both to dis-engage us from fundamental miscarriages and dangers (which it is very easie to slip into, and very hard to wade out of, especially after our so long treading in such an unusual track, as of late we have been much driven into) and to set us straight.

Towards setling in general I should say three things.

First, That we should look well to our setling, look well how we settle.

Secondly, That we should be careful of avoyding *Arbitrariness* of *Government* in our setling.

Thirdly, That we should have regard to the *Rights of the People*, and especially to their *rectifying Right*, that it have its free current.

1. *We should look well to our setling.* Shakings generally tend to setling; and setlings frequently make way for future shakings. Shakings are sudden and violent most commonly, not flowing so much from deliberation as from force: but setlings require great wariness and circumspection, lest that *corruption* which caused our disturbance (and should be shaken out) put on *a new guise*, and settle again on our *new foundation*; whereby there are not only new seed-plots strown of fresh ensuing miseries, but also preparation made for a new *Earthquake*. Therefore it behoveth us to look well about us, and to settle warily, that we may settle surely.

2. *We should be careful to avoyd Arbitrariness of Government in our setling.* If *Arbitrariness* of Power, and a *Government* by *Will*, not *Law*, was our burthen, and that which we so strongly desired and endevored to throw off from our backs: then surely they to whom it appertaineth, and who have engaged themselves to free us from it, ought to be exceeding careful and watchful against involving us again in it. If it hath already miscarryed in one hand,

hand, it may also do in another: However, in reason we are not to be tyed to run the venture. It is not the change of the hand, but the change of the Rule, which we expect as our *foundation* of Safety. He that doth us good in an arbitrary way, and by an arbitrary power to day, may by the same way and power do us harm to morrow.

3. *In our setling regard should be had to the Rights of the People, and especially to their rectifying Right, that it have its free current.* The *Rights* of the People were the main thing presented to view in this great conflict, and therefore in equity should be mainly prosecuted: and most principally those which are their most needful and useful *Rights*. Our *Laws* are our Rights, and we should be loth to be deprived of any of them (whose reason was both good at first, and remaineth still in force:) But there are some Rights and Liberties which are the *root* and *foundation* of our Laws, and our *ultimate Refuge* for succour and safety; and therefore much neater to us, and more essential to our happiness, then others are. These are especially to be regarded. And this so much the rather, because the people are so fit a Body to be subjected and trampled upon, that it is very hard for those which are great in power, to keep their feet from off their necks. Alas, the people have no way to avoyd danger but by running upon the *Rocks*; they have no way to shun ruine, but by hasting into ruine. Those they chuse to govern them gently, to defend them, may sit hard upon their backs, yea themselves may make a prize of them: And if they can in length of time, through many difficulties, obtain and appoint Trustees to rectifie these miscarriages, yet how many temptations they have to mismanage it, they think not of, and how they will manage it, they know not. *Experience* doth still shew how difficult it is throughly to mind the good of the people. One half of the work is sometimes done (sometimes very often) *viz. the crushing of Oppressors:* but the other half, *viz. the breaking the yoke of oppression*, is very rare and hard even for them to do who have prevailed to shake the Oppressors out of their seats.

Thus much in general. Now more particularly, there are four things appear to me as necessary, unto a fair and firm setling.

1. *A clear distinction between the administrative or executive Power, and the legislative or judicative:* that as they have in them-

themselves, so they may retain in their course, their clear and distinct natures, the one not intermixing or intermedling with the other: That the *administrative* may not intermingle it self, or meddle with the *legislative*, but leave it to its own free course; nor the *legislative* with the *administrative* by any extemporary precepts, directions or injunctions, but only by set and known Laws. Things which are severed in their nature must likewise be severed in their use and application, or else we cannot but fail of reaping those fruits and effects which we desire from them, and which otherwise they might bear, and we enjoy.

2. *A prescription of clear and distinct Rules and Bounds to each.* That the *Trust*, *Power*, *Priviledges* and *Duty* of each, which flow from the common light of man, and are intended for the common good of man, may be made evident to that common light; that the people may know hereby what they are to expect from each, what they are to expect from the *Parliament*, what they are to expect from their *supream Governor* or Governors, and so may be understandingly sensible of good or ill usage. There is nothing (among that nature of things we now treat of) of it self unlimited: and the more clearly the limits of any thing are set and known, the greater advantage hath it both to move safely, and to vindicate the integrity and righteousness of its motions. If the limits of Power be not described and made known, it will be left too loose in its actings, and the people also will be left too loose in the interpretation of its actings (neither of them being groundedly able to justifie themselves in either unto the other) neither of which is safe. If the *Parliament* hath one apprehension of its limits, and the people another, they can neither be satisfied in the other; but the people must needs disrelish the actions of the *Parliament*, and the *Parliament* cannot but think themselves injuried by the people, which may occasion the laying of a dangerous foundation of discontent and division between them. Yea hereby the Parliaments best friends may be forced to become its enemies, and it may be forced to deal most sharply with its best friends, and so weaken its best strength, and the best strength of the *Nation*. Those that are friends to *things* are not friends to *persons*, any further then they are subserviente to *things*. It is as hateful to *true-bred spirits* to idolize the name of a *Parliament* any more then of a *King*: it is *righteousness*,

ousness, rightly administred in its own *proper Way* and *channel*, by persons in place and power, which alone can make them lovely to such as love not *men*, but *righteousness*. It was the error of the foregoing governing Power to esteem it self more at liberty, then in right it was; it may also be the error of the present legislative power, yea their condition exposeth them more unto it (their Liberty being larger, or of a larger kind;) and therefore they ought the more abundantly to beware of it, and to apply themselves to produce, or cause to be produced, a true and fair discovery of those bounds and limits wherein they are (by the nature of things) circumscribed: for if they do not know them, it will be impossible for them to keep within them; and if the people do not know them, it may be difficult (in many considerable cases) to them to believe that they do keep within them.

3. *An unquestionably free and equal Parliament.* It is not every *cause* which will produce a true and genuine *effect*, but the cause must be rightly tempered to bring forth kindly fruit. It is not every *Parliament* which can heal or settle a *Nation*, or that the people have just cause to rest satisfied in; but a *Parliament* fairly chosen, equally representing the people, and freely acting for the people.

Now every man knoweth *force* to be opposite to *freedom*. That which is *free* is not *forced*, and that which is *forced* is not *free*.

This *Parliament* hath, visibly to every common eye, been more then once forced; and it is not very easie after violence to break forth again into perfect liberty: the sense and remembrance of the former force, together with an inward fear of the like again (if the like occasion shall happen) may be a secret, though not so apparant a *bond* upon their spirits, which may in some particulars incline them both to do what they would not, and to neglect the doing of what they would.

Besides, it may be considered how far that *visible force*, which caused so great an *alteration* in the *Parliament*, and such a change in affairs, did intrench upon the *freedom* of *Parliament*. For though every *detention* of some or many Members may not disanul the freedom of a *Parliament*, yet some kind of detention, so and so qualified, necessarily doth. An *occasional* or *accidental detention* is

 not

not of so great force as an *intentional*: yet if such an accidental detention of some of the Members should happen, whereby the *state* and *course* of the *Parliament* should be changed, it might well be disputed, whether the rest (still sitting and acting contrary to what was done before those Members were detained) might be accounted a free *Parliament*, (when such a force was visibly upon some part of it, as changed the whole state of affairs in it:) for this were plainly an accidental bending of the *Parliament* from its intended *course*, from its *free current*, and so far as it is bent it is not free. But in the case in hand there was yet more, There was an *intentional* bending of the *Parliament*, (as was expresly declared by them who were the instruments to bend it) there was a culling out of those who stood in the way of what the *Army* thought just, safe and necessary to be done. And this was done purposely that the *Parliament* might be put into another posture, and act other things different from what, as they were then constituted, they could be drawn unto. Now though there should be a violent detention of divers Members of the *Parliament* from doing that service, which they ought and desire to do according to their Judgments and Consciences; yet if the *Parliament* be not bent hereby, but go on in the same path it was walking in before, it hath the greater advantage thereby to argue and to make good its freedom: But if by this force it be visibly and apparantly bent, put into another posture, and into contrary ways and motions, the evidencing of its freedom will, in this case, be more difficult.

There might yet be further added the Judgment of the *Army* concerning this action of their own, who were likely to look favorably upon it being their own, but I purposely wave it: for I do not go about to make the most of these things, but desire only the granting of thus much to me, that this *Parliament* is not unquestionably free, and so the people, who are sensible thereof, cannot rest fully satisfied in their spirits, that this present engine is their evidently-genuine and proper engine.

And as this present *Parliament* is not unquestionably free, no more is it an unquestionably equal Representative of the people, neither in respect of the number of the persons, nor in respect of the qualification of the persons.

First, for *the number of the persons*. Every *County*, *City*, *Borough*,

rough, having their ſtock going, their right and intereſt concerned in the whole, their particular advantage or diſadvantage while *Parliaments* ſit; ſo they ought to have their proper *Subſtitutes* or *Repreſenters* to appear for them, to ſtand in their ſtead, to have an influence in the managing of their particular caſes, and their right in the whole, which, as the caſe now ſtands, many do want.

Secondly, for *the qualification of the perſons*. For it is not a number of perſons (though choſen by the people) ſimply conſidered, that do or can repreſent the people: They are but *ſhadows*, not the *true Repreſentatives* of the People (though deſigned by the people to that end) unleſs they be rightly qualified. How is that? Why thus: by underſtanding the condition and deſires of thoſe they ſtand for, and by repreſenting thoſe deſires ſeaſonably in their ſtead: for they are choſen to be *common perſons*, and therefore ought to have the *common ſenſe* of the *Rights*, *Liberties*, *Safeties*, *Needs*, *Deſires* of thoſe they ſtand for. If a man undertake to appear for me, and doth not know or care to know what I need or deſire, he doth me a double injury; both putting me to the loſs of that which I might obtain, and depriving me of the means I might otherwiſe have attained it by.

Now there is a great exception againſt theſe preſent Repreſenters in this reſpect, the ſtate of things, and conſequently burthens being much changed, ſince they were choſen to repreſent them. It is a long while ſince the firſt ſitting of this *Parliament*, and the change of Power, with other things, may have cauſed many new burthens, which they, being in power, cannot ſo fully feel, nor ſeem ſo fit to be *Judges* of. The *burthens* of the *People* ſtill ariſe from the *preſent Power*, that power from which they did formerly ariſe is removed, another hath ſucceeded: Now they who are the greateſt in the *ſucceeding Power* ſeem no way fit to repreſent the burthens of the people under that power: but ſuch of the common people as lie moſt under them, and moſt feel them, are likely to be moſt fit to repreſent the ſenſe of them. Theſe indeed might be fit, when they were choſen, to be Judges of former burthens and oppreſſions, but they ſeem not now ſo fit to be Judges concerning preſent burthens and oppreſſions: Not that which manageth the power can ſo fairly, clearly and ſenſibly judg whether it be eaſie or grievous, but that which lieth under it.

And here I may not unfitly add one thing concerning the way of managing affairs in *Parliament* so much in use, *viz.* by *Votes*; the necessity whereof in some cases, and the multitude of transactions, may have been an occasion to draw into more common use then is either fit or safe. My ground of excepting against it is this. The actions of the people (and so of the *Parliament*, who are the collective body of the people) should be very clear and evident to the eye of *common sense*, so as to bear down all opposition or gainsaying. The *people* should desire the removal of nothing but what is evidently burthensom, the addition of no *Law* but what is evidently good, the punishment of none but him who hath evidently been an *offender*. But the putting things to Vote is an argument against this clearness and evidence, and doth seem to whisper, if not to speak out, that things are doubtful, and that the determination is also doubtful, arising not necessarily from the strength of reason, but perhaps from the number of voyces. I confess it is impossible for such a body to manage many affairs without this course: but I cannot conceive that ever *Nature* cut out such a *body* for the managing of many affairs. It is a body of the common people, who are not supposed to be skilful in administring *Government*, nor intended to meddle in managing of *affairs*, but only to set them in a right posture, and in a fair way of *administration*. A few, easie, necessary things, such as *common sense*, *reason* and *experience* instructeth the *common sort* of men in, are the fittest things for them to apply themselves unto. Indeed the people should have no more hand in or rather about *Government*, then necessity requires for their own preservation, safety and welfare; and dispatch quickly what they have to do (as a few plain things may quickly be done) and so return into *subjection* unto *Government* again, whereby alone they will be able to know whether they have done well or ill in what they have done. Again, as it is a Body of the *common people*, so it is of a *great bulk* (it cannot be otherwise formed,) and therefore not fited for many motions, but only for such as are slow and sure. Yet their slowness of motion (the right order of *nature* being observed) will be neither burdensom to themselves nor others, being recompenced by the fewness of those things which *Nature* (I mean the nature of their end, call and trust) hath appointed for them to do.

4. *A regular Way of Elections:* that the people might be put into a fair, clear, understanding way of managing this: that they might not be urged from favour to the present *administring power* to make their choyce according to their desires, but might be left free therein, and might be incited to wariness by being instructed of what concernment their choyce is: that if they chuse amiss they contribute towards the laying a foundation of enslaving themselves and the whole *Nation.* The people have a sense of their own *good,* as well as a desire to please their *Superiors,* and if that sense were by suitable means quickened in them at the time or season when they chuse, they would be so much the more careful to make choyce of such as were fittest to represent that sense. In such a great and extraordinary *Remedy* there should be extraordinary care about every step and degree of the framing and constituting of it, that we may be sure (as sure as possibly we can) to have it right and fit for its appointed end and use: for one error here is as it were a *Womb* of danger and misery, which hereby it is in a way to bring forth. Now that the people might put themselves, or rather be put (for they can hardly do any thing themselves orderly) into such a posture as they might chuse most advantagiously to their own good; and that those whom they chuse might the better understand the *end, work,* &c. for which they are chosen, and the better apply themselves thereto; that both these might be more commodiously done, I shall propound these three things. (And here I desire free scope in the ballance of every ones Judgment, for I propose not these things from any conceit of them, but meerly from the strength of that *reason* which representeth it self to me in them, having no desire they should take place, so much as in any ones mind, any further then the *reason* in them makes way there for them, and it will be my delight and joy to see them give place to any thing which is better or more solid.)

1. That the *Counties, Cities* or *Boroughs* meet together (as they were wont to do to chuse their *Knights, Citizens* or *Burgesses*) to chuse a convenient number of their Commonalty as a *Committee* to chuse their *Knights, Citizens* or *Burgesses* for them for that one time.

I speak now in general concerning a convenient way of chusing, but if I were to speak concerning a sudden new choyce, I should

add this. That none ſhould be admitted either to be choſen or to vote in this choyce, but ſuch as have been *faithful* to their *Country* in the late great *defection*: for which end, that *exceptions* ſhould be drawn up, and great *penalties* annexed to them, to be inflicted on ſuch as ſhould venture to give their vote, who are excepted from chuſing; or ſuch as ſhall accept of the choyce, who are excepted from being choſen. (Only theſe *exceptions* ſhould be ſo plain, as there may be no cauſe of doubt or ſcruple concerning the interpretation of any of them, leſt they prove a *ſnare* to any to deprive them of the exerciſe of their juſt Right and Liberty herein.) It is undeniably juſt and rational, that the people having fought for their *Rights* and *Liberties*, and purchaſed them with the expence of their *blood*, ſhould now enjoy them, and not permit ſuch a participation of thoſe among them, who endeavored and fought againſt them, as may cauſe a new hazard of the return of that into their hands, which hath been thus difficultly and coſtlily recovered from them.

2. That this *Committee* immediately upon their being choſen (before or at their firſt ſitting) may have an *Oath* adminiſtred unto them, to this intent, That without *partiality*, regard to *friendſhip*, or any other *by-reſpect*, they ſhall chuſe (either from among themſelves or elſewhere) him whom they ſhall judg moſt fit, both for ability and fidelity, to ſerve his *Country* in general, and that *County*, *City*, or *Borough* in particular,

3. That this *Committee*, immediately after they have finiſhed their choyce, conſult about and draw up (and that an *Oath* be adminiſtred for this end likewiſe, or a clauſe for it inſerted in the former *Oath*) a Copy of what, according to their Conſciences, they conceive them to be entruſted with by the people; with what kind of *power*, in what *ſphere*, and to what *end*; which might be before them as a *Light* and *Rule* unto them, though not abſolute, yet it might be very helpful: Whereas otherwiſe (without ſome ſuch help) perſons called to that employment may be ignorant what their work is, and from this ignorance (and their own modeſty together) may joyn with others in the way they find them in (if a *Parliament* be ſitting) or in the way ſome, who are moſt looked upon, may propoſe; in the mean while they themſelves not underſtanding where they are, to what direct *end*, or upon

what

what *ground* they act. And I must confess this hath ever made me unwilling to venture upon that *employment*, not having clear and certain *instruction* how or what to act therein: and I must confess my self somewhat unsatisfied to undertake a *Trust*, the nature whereof is not clearly manifested unto me. I am content to serve my *Country* with all my poor strength, but withall cannot but be shy of such a snare of doing them disservice in stead of service, as my own remediless ignorance herein may necessarily expose me to. And perhaps there may be some others who may stand in need of this help as well as I: however, a clear and plain way of knowledg, methinks, should be burdensom to none.

Such kind of things as these are proper transactions for a *Parliament*, for there may be errors or defects in this kind which the people cannot come together to consult about and heal, yet it is requisite such things, in this kind amiss, should be healed, who therefore fitter to do it then their *Representatives?* And what might not be done in this nature, and entertained thankfully by the people, if it were so managed, upon such plain *grounds* of *Reason* and *principles* of *Justice*, and in such a *plain clear way*, as might carry *conviction*, that it was not done from any *selfish respects*, but for *common good*. It is a jealousie in the people, that their *Substitutes* neglect them, and mind themselves, which makes them interpret their actions so ill, which jealousie by this means would easily be rooted out of the people, nay it would fall of it self.

These are the things which to me seem necessary to set us right. And if it were once thus, that *Powers* were rightly distinguished according to their own *natures*, rightly bounded within their own *spheres, ranks, orders and places*; if there were also a *Parliament* in every respect fairly chosen, set right in its *constitution*, and rightly acting according to its own *nature, end* and *work* within its own *bounds*, there might be some ground of *hope* both towards the well setling of things at present, and the easie further amending of what should be found amiss afterwards. But I dare confidently affirm it, that until the *true way, course* and *end* of Nature be discovered and observed, let there be never so many other advantages; a *Parliament* never so *wise*, never so *industrious*, never so *faithful*; a *People* never so *pliable* and *thankefull*, never so *quiet* and *patient*,

both

both in submitting unto the pains of their cure; and in continual renewing of their expectations when it will once be; yet the desired end will never be effected by the *Parliament*, nor enjoyed by the *People*. If a *Parliament* will produce such or such effects, it must become such or such a cause as is proper to produce those effects, (and operate like that cause) otherwise it will be impossible.

There is one thing more I desire to mention, of no small importance, (with the same freedom which I have used hitherto) which hath been acted publiquely in the sight of the world, and will one day be examined more publiquely. That which is well done will endure a review; and that which is ill done doth deserve a review, that it might be amended: yea that which is of very great consequence may in equity require a review.

The thing is this, that there might be a Revisal of this present *Government* (whether by this present Parliament, or an ensuing, or by both, I determine not) wherein it might be taken into full consideration (more full perhaps then that present *exigence* of affairs, when it was first pitched upon, would permit;) First, the *necessity* of a change; and secondly, the *commodiousness* of this change, or certainty of *advantage* by this change: for changes are never good but when they are necessary, and when the change is certainly, or at least very probably, for the better. Now as there is at some times *need* of a *change*, so there is at other times an *itching humour* in man after change, when there is no need: yet a man who hath a mind to change, will take it for granted that there is a need of change, and run greedily into it though he suffer loss thereby, changing for that which is ten times worse, even in that very respect, because of which he changeth, only his eye being blinded by his present desire and interest, he cannot discern it.

There ought to be much *circumspection* in all weighty changes: This, being the most weighty and of most concernment to the people, deserves the greater wariness and the more thorow scanning. It doth not become *wise men* to take a prejudice against a thing because they have smarted by it, or to conceive well of another thing because it is *different* from that, or because it appeareth *plausible* at first view, or because they have not yet had experience of

the

the *inconvenientness*, *evil* or *danger* of it; but narrowly to pierce into the *ground* and *nature* of things, and from a clear sight thereof to bottom their change.

In changing either *Governments* or *Governors*, it is very incident to man to be unjust. Man ordinarily doth that unjustly which is just to be done. Because of his sense of smart, he is become an *enemy* (and so far an unfit Judg) to that and them which he smarted by; and can very hardly afford them a fair hearing of what they can say for themselves. Yet this is the due of every thing which is layd aside. And for my part, though I shall not plead for the resettlement of *Kingly Government* (for I am not so far engaged in my affections to it, as it yet hath been) yet I would have a fair and friendly shaking hands with it, and not any blame layd upon it beyond its desert: For doubtless it is both *proper*, *good* and *useful* in its kinde, and hath its *advantages* above any other *Government* on the one hand, as it hath also its *disadvantages* on the other hand.

Now since I have waded thus far herein, I will proceed a little further, propounding what way I should judg most convenient for my self to take, if I were to have an hand in this particular, so as I might discharge it with most *Justice* in reference to the thing it self, and with most *satisfaction* in reference to my own spirit. (Every man must be master of what he doth in his own Understanding, or he cannot act justly; and his heart is poor and weak, if it can be satisfied in managing things beyond his strength.)

In the first place (supposing I had Power) I would require such *learned Lawyers*, as I should judg most fit, to give me a plain and full description of *Kingly Government*; of the *Duty*, *Power*, *Prerogatives* of it, with all the *several bounds* of it, according to the *Laws* of this *Land*.

Secondly, I would consider, whether any of these were *defective*; and particularly since the *Prerogative part* was so encroaching, what *bonds* might be layd upon it for the future, and how far they might be able to binde it fast from intrenching upon the *Rights* and *Liberties* of the People.

Thirdly, I would consider, what *security* or *certainty* might be had of a setled course of *Parliaments* in fitting seasons and with

 sufficient

sufficient Power for remedying any grievances which might arise to the People from this *Government*, or from any *Governors* which might be employed in it: for in every *Government* there are (besides the Supreme) *Sub-governors*, who are usually the greatest Oppressors.

Having done this, fully and fairly, to the satisfaction (not of my *will* or *desire*, but) of my *understanding unbyassed*; I would as fairly propound, to my view, the other *Government*, which might seem fit to succeed in the stead of this. I would take a full draught of it; the *Duty*, *Power*, *Prerogatives* (for such it ought to have; its work being hard, in equity it should have priviledges to sweeten it) and *several limits* of it. I would consider again and again, how it could be bound faster then the other: How the *Convention* and *Session* of *Parliaments* in season, with full *Power and Freedom*, might be more certain under this. And after full and thorow consideration of every thing needful to be considered, if it did indeed appear that *Errors* in the former kinde of *Government* could not safely or easily be amended, nor the *dangers* thereof well prevented, but might with much more safety and ease be both amended and prevented in the latter; then would I abolish the former, and settle the latter.

This, in my apprehension, would be a fair and just way, and would not expose me to drink in *prejudices* (which become not a *Judg*) against the *Government* which is to be called into question; or to lay that as a particular *Objection* to it, which other Governments are as liable unto. *Neglecting of Duty, grasping of extraordinary Power, enlarging of Priviledges and Prerogatives, trampling upon them that are low, that are as it were the earth under them, riding in pomp upon the backs of the People, &c.* these are common to every *Government*, and will be growing up under every *Government* further then they are powerfully suppressed. As for that great Objection of the enmity of *Kingly Government* to *Parliaments*, any other Government may be as liable to it. No ordinary supreme Power loveth an extraordinary supreme Power; and what Power soever be set up, it will go near (if much care be not used to prevent it) to have an influence upon the choyce of *Parliament* men, and will be molding the *Parliament* to it self, which if it cannot do, it will hardly loolo upon it as its friend. I

must

must confess the changing of the form of *Government* is not so considerable in my eye, but the fixing of so strong and safe bounds and limits, as a good Governor or Governors may delight to keep within, and a bad or bad ones may not be able to break through: which may be much helped by the frequent use of *Parliaments*, if they can be kept within their bounds, or else that will be worst of all according to that known Maxim, *Corruptio optimi pessima*, the best thing being corrupted proveth worst.

When this is done (for I do not look upon it as yet done, till all reviews, which in reason and equity can be desired, are first over) and *the supreme Governor* or *Governors* fully agreed upon: then it will be seasonable, just and requisite to restore to them those *Rights* and *Priviledges* which belong unto them, and which it is the minde of the People they should have: as particularly his or their *consent* in making *Laws*. It is great reason the People should make their own Laws; and it is as agreeable to Reason, that he who is to govern by them should consent unto them. As the People (so far as they understand themselves) cannot but be unwilling to be made slaves by their *Governor*, to be governed by such *Lams* as he should make at his pleasure: so neither should they desire to make him a slave, by putting what *Laws* they please into his hand, requiring him to take care of the observation of them: but a mutual agreement & transaction in things of this nature is fairest and most just. Yea this would be most advantagious to the people; for he who constantly weilds the *Scepter* is in likelyhood best able to give advice concerning *Laws*, and may put them into a better way (by vertue of his *experience*) of attaining their *ends* and *desires* then they of themselves can light upon. If *the chief Governor* or *Governors* shall refuse to assent to such *Laws* as are evidently good and necessary, a better remedy may be found out then the depriving of him from this Liberty. The true way of curing is difficult, requiring much *skill*, *care* and *pains*; the common way of man is by running out of one *extream* into another, which he is apt to please himself much in, because he observeth himself at such a distance from that which he found so inconvenient and perhaps so mischievous before. But this is neither just in it self, nor can prove either easie or safe in the issue.

To draw to a *conclusion*; I shall onely mention some few *properties*

perties of a *good Governor*, to which the people should have respect in their choyce; and to which he who is chosen by the People to that degree and honor, should have respect in his acting.

There are two *properties* or *proper Ways of motion* (which contain in them several properties) of a good *Governor*, which, if he will be furnished unto, will make him very useful and serviceable in his place.

1. To manage his *Trust* with all *care* and *fidelity*. To neglect himself, his own particular *ease*, *pleasure*, *advantage*; and apply himself to the *good* of the whole. To minister *Justice* equally, fairly, freely, speedily; and *mercy* tenderly. To punish meerly for necessity sake, but to relieve from his heart.

2. To settle the *Foundations* (so far as lies in his way and within his reach) of the *Peoples Liberty*, *Peace* and *Welfare*, that it may be in a thriving condition growing still more and more: For the welfare of the People doth not so much consist in a quiet, prosperous, setled state at present, as in a good seed for future growth, whereby alone the Government can come to yeeld the good fruit of a present good setling. It may cost much at present to manure the ground and plant a good Government, the benefit is to be reaped afterwards, which will lie much in the *Governor*, who may help much to cherish or blast it.

The main thing in a *Governor* (which will much fit him unto both these) is to keep within his bounds: Not to think or undertake to do all the good which is needful to be done, but that good which belongs to his place and office: Not to avoyd bonds, but to desire to be bound as fast as may be. He who is indeed unwilling to *transgress*, *to do evil*; is willing to be tyed up, as fast and close as can be, from all *temptations* and *advantages* thereunto. Good honest plain-dealing-hearts are too apt to desire scope, thinking onely to improve it for good; and others are too apt to trust them, little suspecting that they will do otherwise, till at length on a sudden so evident snares and temptations overtake them, as give too plain a proof of the contrary. This *experience* is so deep, that it may well be questioned, *Whether it were better to have a bad Governor being fast bound, or a good Governor being at liberty*; which would be very difficult

cult to resolve, because on the one hand it is so hard to finde bonds to binde a bad Governor fast enough, and so difficult on the other hand for a good Governor being left at liberty, to act well. He who hath had experience what he is, when he is left *at liberty*, and what others are when they are left *at liberty* (how easily his or their *Judgment*, *Will* and *Affections* are perverted) will neither desire to be left at liberty himself, nor to have others left at liberty. A good *Governor* might do great service in this respect, namely both by a ready compliance with his bonds (for the good and necessary use of them) which is very rare; as also by seeking further bonds, where he can discover starting holes, which is yet more rare.

Man naturally seeketh *liberty from bonds*, desireth to avoyd them: He would binde others, but be without bonds himself: Others need bonds, but he can act well without them, yea he can do more good without them then with them: They may be a fit *curb* for others, but they will be but a *clog* to him in the pursuit of the peoples happiness, whereby he shall be hindered from doing that good service which he would and otherwise might: Thus the best men, many times, come to do most hurt, least suspecting themselves, and being least mistrusted by others. (Who would not beleeve his own heart, that if he were in place and Power he would not do thus or thus, but amend this and that and the other thing; and the more scope he had, the better and more swiftly would he do it?) But to seek *bonds*, to desire to be hedged up from every thing that is *unlawful* or *unfit*; to seek where one might evade and prepare before-hand *strength* to resist it, *engines* to oppose and keep it back, this is as unusual an undertaking in *Governors*, as needful and profitable for the people.

There would one great *advantage* from this arrive unto *Posterity*, besides that which the People themselves might enjoy under it at present: for it would make the fruit of a good *GOVERNORS* Government extend it self to future *Generations*, in this respect, because by this means there would be bonds prepared to tie up such as should afterwards succeed, who might be more inclinable to break

forth into unjust and by-ways, then a present Governor or Governors. There are none who have such advantage to espy starting-holes, as those who are penned up: and if they be careful in espying and faithful in stopping up those holes (by putting the *Parliament* upon setting such fences of Laws so made about them, as may best secure the People in this respect) the *Administration* will soon prove both regular and safe, as also in a thriving condition, in so much as that the *Liberty*, *Safety*, and *sound Prosperity* of the People will grow more and more upon them.

FINIS.